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Abstract
This paper analyzes the choice between different innovation activities of a firm. In
particular, we study the technology acquisition decision of the firm, i.e. its technology
BUY decision as part of the firm’s innovation strategy. We take a closer look at the
different types of external technology acquisition where we distinguish two broad
types of technology buy decisions. On the one hand, the firm can acquire new
technology which is embodied in an asset that is acquired such as new personnel or
(parts of) other firms or equipment. On the other hand, the firm can obtain new
technology disembodied through a licensing agreement or by outsourcing the
technology development from an R&D contractor or consulting agency. Through a
series of Probit regressions, we discuss variables that might affect external technology
acquisition choices of the firm and pay special attention to the firm’s abilities to scan
the market for technology and to absorb the technology acquired. Furthermore, we
analyze the effect of different appropriation regimes on the decision of the firm to
source technology.
Keywords: Technology acquisition, innovation, appropriability, absorptive capacity.
JEL: L22, O323
1. Introduction
Successful innovation depends on the development and integration of new knowledge
in the innovation process. Today even the largest and most technologically self-
sufficient organizations require knowledge from beyond their boundaries. In order to
access alternative knowledge sources, the innovation strategy of the firm will combine
different innovation activities. In addition to doing own research and development,
firms typically are engaged in the acquisition and sale of knowledge on the
technology market and cooperate actively in R&D with other firms and research
organizations. Furthermore, they can attempt to absorb existing technology without
any explicit involvement or permission from the innovator. However, external
knowledge sources and spillovers do not automatically find their way into the firm’s
innovation process. An important task in innovation management, therefore, is to
optimally integrate external knowledge into the firm’s innovation process.
While there is ample theoretical and empirical research on firm and industry
determinants of internal R&D, the literature deals less with the choice between
different innovation activities, in particular external technology acquisition. In this
paper we study the technology acquisition decision of the firm, i.e. its technology
BUY decision as part of the firm’s innovation strategy.  First, we discuss the variables
that might affect the decision of the firm to buy technology. Second, we take a closer
look at the different types of external technology acquisition. We distinguish two
broad types of technology buy decisions of the firm. On the one hand, the firm can
acquire new technology which is embodied in an asset that is acquired such as new
personnel or (parts of) other firms or equipment. On the other hand, the firm can
obtain new technology disembodied through a licensing agreement or by outsourcing
the technology development from an R&D contractor or consulting agency.
The performance of a firm’s innovation strategy that relies on successfully
integrating externally acquired technology, depends not only on a successful outcome
of the innovation process based on this information, but also on the ability of the firm
to appropriate the benefits from this innovation. The success of the innovation process
depends on the internal research capabilities of the organization. With respect to
externally acquired technology these capabilities perform two functions. First, the
research capability of the organization allows the firm to better scan the environment4
for relevant external technology sources. Second, the internal research capability of
the firm increases its absorptive capacity and improves the integration of external
knowledge into the innovation process. In our analysis we will attempt to identify
both of these effects of own research and development.
Futhermore, the appropriability regime will affect the decision to buy
technology externally, as well as the mode in which the acquisition will occur. In
general, we would expect that better appropriation of innovation results would lead to
more technology transactions. Better legal protection might favor disembodied
technology transactions, while strategic protection, which is based on co-specializing
assets, would lead to more embodied technology transactions. If the firm’s
competitive advantage is based on gaining lead time on competitors, we might also
observe more firms buying technology, which typically saves time compared to own
development.
Using data from the Community Innovation Survey on Belgian manufacturing
firms, our empirical results indicate that the capability to scan the external
environment for new technology is important in understanding the decision of the
firm to buy technology. The capability of the firm to integrate new external
knowledge into its innovation process, however, is only significant for the
disembodied technology acquisition, and more specifically for the R&D contracting.
Appropriability through legal mechanisms positively affects disembodied technology
acquisition, in particular licensing. Strategic protection, on the contrary, strongly
determines the embodied technology acquisition mode. Other variables of interest are
risk and costs of the innovation process, and lack of innovation personnel. Higher
levels of uncertainty of the innovation process reduces the likelihood that firms are
able to agree on the transfer of disembodied technology and the lack of innovation
personnel increases the likelihood of buying technology in the form of R&D
contracting. High costs for developing technology drive firms to buy existing
embodied technology.
The next section reviews the literature on technology buy decisions. Section 3
describes our sample and section 4 presents the results on who buys technology and
how they organize these transactions. Section 5 concludes.5
2. Technology Buy: Theory
The existing literature on the decision to buy technologies is mostly focused on the
“make versus buy” decision. Less theory exists on comparing different modes of
trading technology.   This section reviews the economic theory on technology buy,
scans the technology management literature on advantages and disadvantages of the
various modes of technology acquisition, to conclude with related empirical studies.
In the economics literature, technology acquisition is typically of the
disembodied kind, through R&D contracting.  Building further on the general
literature on make or buy decisions, i.e. transaction cost economics (Williamson,
1985) and property rights theory (Grossman & Hart, 1986), the theoretical framework
to explain R&D outsourcing stresses the advantage of tapping existing often more
specialized knowledge if available. This leads to time gains and lower innovation
costs to the extent that economies of scale in R&D can be more efficiently exploited.
However technology outsourcing may create considerable transaction costs, ex ante in
terms of search and negotiation costs and ex post to execute and enforce the contract.
The typical uncertain nature of R&D projects exacerbates these transaction costs.
Hence, R&D contracting is more likely to occur for generic, non-firm specific R&D
that allows for specialization advantages, such as routine research tasks like materials
testing, and process rather than product innovations (Mowery & Rosenberg, 1989).
The economic literature on buying technology disembodied through licensing
usually takes the position of the seller, analysing the motives for licensing one’s
technology, rather than to focus on the decision of the licensee to buy or not.  These
licensing motives range from generating a stream of licensing revenues over
increasing own sales to strategic motives, preempting the emergence of strong
competitors who would else develop own technology (Gallini (1984) Katz & Shapiro
(1986)).
In addition, the appropriability regime will influence the innovation strategy
selected (Teece, 1986). When appropriability is high, firms are willing to develop
technology internally and to sell their technology to other firms to appropriate the
benefits from innovating. Hence, firms that decide to acquire technology externally,
are more likely to acquire this technology in disembodied form such as through
licensing agreements or R&D contracts. Loose appropriation environments quickly
erode a firm’s technological advantage. In that case firms will develop specialized6
complementary assets internally to protect their technology.  This is reminiscent of
the “resource based” view of the firm who stresses the imperfect mobility of resources
as a condition to sustain a firm’s competitive advantage. Firms that decide to acquire
technology externally, acquire this technology in embodied form through the
acquisition of other firms or by attracting specialized personnel.  Furthermore, we
expect external technology sourcing when assets complementary to the technology are
in competitive supply such that the small numbers bargaining hazards are minimized
(Pisano, 1990).
The difficulties in appropriating know-how allow for knowledge to diffuse,
and external know-how to be accessed, without any explicit involvement from the
sending party and even despite attempts from firms generating know-how to keep this
proprietary (Arrow (1962)).  The channels through which such “spillovers” occur are
many. Next to information leakage channels such as informal communications
networks, meetings, input suppliers and customers, patent applications,  Mansfield
(1985) identified mobility of researchers and reverse engineering as important
channels through which such “spillovers” occur.  While the former are spillovers in
the sense that there is no “direct purchase” from the original source, the latter two
channels are embodied acquisition of know-how.  By now an extensive theoretical
literature in Industrial Organisation has developed around the effects of such
spillovers on the incentives for investment in R&D (see De Bondt (1996) for a
review).  On the one hand, this literature demonstrates that spillovers reduce own
R&D by the sending firm, since the latter cannot fully internalize all benefits from its
investment, cf. the disincentive effect (Spence (1984)). Simultaneously, external R&D
will typically substitute for own R&D in the receiving firm. This implies that own
R&D and external knowledge received through spillovers act as substitutes. On the
other hand, there is typically a market enhancement or cost reducing effect that should
stimulate efforts. The size of these effects typically depend on the degree of
competition between firms and the tightness of the appropriation regime (De Bondt et.
al. (1992)).  Related, the notion of ‘absorptive capacity’ introduced by Cohen &
Levinthal (1989) stresses the importance of a stock of prior knowledge to effectively
absorb spillovers.  In such a setting, the desire to assimilate external know-how
creates a positive incentive to invest in R&D.  Hence spillovers may rather than
diminish own R&D encourage equilibrium industry R&D investments.7
The technology management literature emphasizes as advantages of external
sourcing the option to get quick access to technological know-how, which is
important when the firm lacks familiarity with, or competence in, the new
market/technology.  At the same time this already indicates a major roadblock to
external sourcing, namely matching the existing technological capabilities of the
receiving firm with the transmission capacity of the source.  Chatterji (1996)
pinpoints as a general problem in external sourcing strategies an insufficient “post-
agreement” management and commitment to the external sourcing strategy.  To
overcome the extra costs of external sourcing, an organisational structure that builds
in absorptive capacity and is able to overcome the classic “not invented here”
syndrome, is an important asset.  Allen (1986) suggests the use of technological
gatekeepers to improve the external sourcing strategy, as a way of bridging the gap
between internal and external environment.
Next to organisational issues,  the effectiveness of transfer is also determined
by the nature of the innovation.  Transfer is easier when the know-how is less
complex, less radical and less tacit  (Afuah (1998)).  This relates to the life-cycle of
the technology.  Utterback & Abernathy (1975) already stressed that external sourcing
is less likely to occur for technologies that are still in their initial development stage,
when there is lots of uncertainty surrounding the technology.
The technology management literature also discusses the different modes of
accessing external sourcing (Chatterji (1996)). When choosing the mode of external
sourcing, ranging from acquisition to majority-minority holdings to networking and
short-term contracting, the basic trade-off is commitment and control versus
flexibility. 
1  More flexible modes are more attractive for ill-defined, embryonic
technology with a high level of risk for which the company is unfamiliar, while higher
control modes are more important when appropriation is weak, assets specialized and
the technology is highly relevant for sustaining a competitive advantage.
                                                       
1 A seminal paper is Roberts & Berry (1985) that stresses the importance of the level of
familiarity with the market and technology when choosing the mode of new business
development.  Acquisitions or licensing are preferred when the changes are small to
modest, while for radical innovations Roberts and Berry suggest using more flexible
modes such as venture capital.  A similar trade-off prevails in a more broader literature
on the mode of technological cooperation (Cheesa & Manzini (1998), Chesbrough &
Teece (1996), Oxley (1997)8
Given the scarcity of adequate data, the choice of external sourcing mode
remains relatively unexplored in empirical studies.  Pisano (1990) uses data from
biotech projects from pharmaceutical companies to study the choice between internal
and external sourcing.  After controlling for size, nationality and expercience, he finds
support for the small number hazard problem pushing towards internal sourcing.
Similarly, Grandstand & Sjölander (1990) using case studies and pilot surveys to
study acquisition of new technology-bases firms (NTBFs) by large firms, find that
when the innovation is characterized by a seller’s market, acquisitions of NTBFs are
less successful.  In addition, they report continuity of key R&D personnel and top
management as important for success.  Arora & Gambardella (1990) study four types
of external sourcing strategies for large chemical and pharmaceutical companies in
biotechnology (agreements with other firms, with universities, investments in NTBFs
and acquisitions of NTBFs). They find evidence for complementarity for all types of
sourcing strategies, even after correcting for a set of firm characteristics.  The
correction for firm characteristics suggests that large firms with higher internal
knowledge, measured by number of patents are more actively involved in pursuing
strategies of external linkages.
The complementarity between internal and external sourcing is further
explored in Arora & Gambardella (1994), where they identify two effects from
internal know-how.  On the one hand, internal know-how is necessary to screen
available projects.  On the other hand, internal know-how serves to effectively utilize
the external assessed know-how.  Using scientific know-how as proxy for the first
role, and technological know-how for the second, they find support for both. Blonigen
& Taylor (1997) also identify two possible hypotheses for the effects of R&D
activities of the firm on its acquisition strategy. The first hypothesis states that internal
R&D and technological acquisitions are substitutes leading to a negative relationship
between the two, while the second hypothesis argues that internal R&D stimulates
synergy gains from potential targets, and therefore leads to a positive relationship
between the two. Using R&D intensity to test for the first hypothesis, and R&D
expenditures to test for the latter, they find support for both hypotheses on a panel of
US electronics firms.  Also Veugelers & Cassiman (1999) find evidence for internal
know-how development and external sourcing to complement each other at the firm
level, while Veugelers (1997) finds external sourcing to stimulate internal R&D
expenditures, at least for firms with internal R&D departments.9
3. Sample
The data used for this research are innovation data on the Belgian manufacturing
industry that were collected as part of the Community Innovation Survey conducted
by Eurostat in the different member countries in 1993. A representative sample of
1335 Belgian manufacturing firms was selected resulting in a response of 735 usable
questionnaires. 
2  About 60% of the firms in the sample claim to innovate, while only
40% do not innovate.  We restrict the analysis to the 494 innovative firms in the
sample. These firms introduced new or improved products or processes in the last two
years and returned a positive amount spent on innovation.
For this sample we can identify whether and how firms acquire new
technology. Identification of  external sourcing is based only on whether one of these
external sourcing activities have been used or not. Information on budgets was
incomplete and unreliable. We classify technology acquisition in two broad
categories. First, the organization can acquire new technology that has to be
assimilated by the organization. Disembodied technology acquisition strategies
include licensing, R&D contracting and the use of technology consulting agencies.
Second, new technology can be acquired that is embodied in the good or asset that is
acquired: embodied technology acquisition. Such strategies include acquisition of
firms (take-overs) and attracting qualified personnel. The “embodied” purchase of
equipment, is reported as well but not included in the main analysis.  This is because
too many firms responded positively on this item.  Probably not all of them
interpreted the question as buying equipment with the explicit purpose of obtaining
new technologies as an alternative to developing the technology internally. 
3 Also
reported separately is the category of “other forms of acquisition”.  Although this
could be capturing involuntary spillovers, it is not retained in the main analysis as a
buying activity since it is unclear what is included here.
                                                       
2 The researchers in charge of collecting the data also performed a limited non-response
analysis and concluded that no systematic bias could be detected (Debackere & Fleurent,
1995).
3  In addition, buying equipment from suppliers, is clearly a different strategy, as noted
by Pavitt (1984),  who found that supplier dominated industries are less R&D intense
and more process oriented than other industries.10
--------------------------------
Insert Table 1 about here
--------------------------------
Table 1 shows that of all innovation-active companies in the sample, 331 or
67%, were identified as acquiring technology in disembodied or embodied form.  If
we would have included purchase of equipment this would have resulted in 80% of
innovative companies buying technology externally.  Of those who buy technology,
86% also do R&D internally, i.e. combine make and buy, while 60% of technology
buying companies also cooperate on R&D. All this seems to suggest that acquisition
of external know-how is embedded within the acquiring firm’s larger innovation
strategy.
The data are most unique in their ability to disaggregate the acquisition of
technology into its various modes.  About 77% of companies buying technology do
this disembodied, ie through (in decreasing order:) R&D outsourcing, licensing and
consulting. Ignoring the purchase of equipment, the mechanism used most frequently
for acquiring technology, is hiring skilled people (58%). Important to note is that
firms often combine embodied and disembodied acquisition of technology: 43% of all
technology buying companies use both embodied and disembodied purchase. In
addition, firms that have own permanent R&D activities are more likely to be engaged
in R&D contracting, indicating a strong complementarity between own R&D and this
mode of external technology sourcing
4
--------------------------------
Insert Table 2 about here
--------------------------------
In the sample of innovative companies, 31% have less than 50 employees.  If
we restrict the sample to these small firms (see Table 2), the percentage of innovative
small firms that are buying drops to 50%.  Small firms are especially less likely to buy
disembodied technology: R&D contracting, R&D consulting and licensing.   For
example, only 12% of firms contracting out R&D have less than 50 employees,
                                                       
4 53% of permanently R&D active firms use R&D contracting, while this is for 46.5%
for the total sample, a difference that is statistically significant.  This is the only mode for
which a significant difference is detected between permanent R&D active and non-active
firms.11
indicating a significant underrepresentation.  For the embodied technology acquisition
in the form of hiring of personnel, the share of small companies is 26%, again a
significant underrepresentation.
Besides characterizing the innovation strategies of the companies along the
buy dimension, the questionnaire also allows us to assess other important dimensions
of the innovation process. The respondents were asked to rate the importance to their
innovation strategy of different information sources for the innovation process, the
effectiveness of protection of innovations and the importance of different obstacles to
innovation. 
5
4. Econometric results on who buys and how they buy?
To analyze the different ways that firms can structure their external technology
acquisition activities, we classify all the actively innovating firms according to the
various embodied and disembodied technology acquisition modes. We first analyse
the firm and industry variables determining the decision to buy technology in general.
The same set of firm and industry variables is then used to analyse each technology
acquisition mode separately.  This allows us to compare the importance of different
characteristics according to the different modes.  There exists very little theory to
formulate hypotheses on the variables that influence the decision of the firm to opt for
different modes of technology acquisition and in particular whether this acquisition
happens in embodied or disembodied form. The results reported here should therefore
be considered indicative of important relations between the mode of technology
acquisition and firm and industry characteristics, and, are intended to stimulate further
research on the issue.
4.1 The variables and hypotheses
As firm characteristics we include SIZE, as measured by sales.  Larger firms may
have higher market power or they may enjoy economies of scale which raise the
payoffs to all or some external sourcing strategies. In addition, the data allow us to
                                                       
5 Firms had to rate their answer on a 5-point Likert scale (from unimportant (1) to crucial
(5)). In order to manage the answers on these many questions, we aggregated the
answers by summing the scores on related variables and rescaled the total scores to a12
test whether obstacles to innovations such as uncertainty, lack of funds and lack of
R&D personnel influence the firm’s decision to source externally.  Following the
transaction costs literature, high levels of technological uncertainty disfavors external
sourcing, while the technology management literature stresses that a lack of internal
resources may drive the firm towards external sourcing.
The literature on complementarity between internal innovative capacity and
external sourcing stresses different mechanisms through which this complementary
relationship holds. The variable OPEN measures how important publicly available
external information is to the innovative activities of the firm.  This serves to control
for the openness to and awareness of external know-how arising from the screening or
scanning potential from internal resources. 
6  The presence of a permanent R&D
activity, measured as a dummy, captures whether own R&D substitutes for external
technology or whether it functions as general “absorptive capacity”, which
complements externally sourced technology.   BasicRD measures the importance for
the innovation process of information from research institutes and universities relative
to the importance of suppliers and customers as an information source. We use this
variable to proxy for the “basicness” of R&D performed by the firm. A more basic
type of innovation suggests less proprietary know-how in the initial phases of the
technology life cycle. However, firms capable of assimilating a lot of information
from universities or research institutes, probably possess higher absorptive capacity.
An important factor affecting the relative importance of different innovation
activities of a firm, identified in the theoretical literature and so far ignored in the
most empirical studies, is the appropriation regime.  The survey assessed how
effective the sample firms could appropriate the rents from their innovations.
Different appropriation mechanisms could be identified: legal (patents and trade
marks), and, strategic (complexity, secrecy or lead time).  Firms that are more
effective at appropriating the benefits from innovation will have larger payoffs from
their external sourcing strategies.  It remains to be seen whether this holds for all
technology buying activities or whether different appropriation mechanisms affect
different technology acquisition decisions, a question hitherto unexplored in the
                                                                                                                                                              
number between 0 and 1 for comparability. For a summary of the questions and
categories we selected, see infra.13
literature. For this we need to make a distinction between the demand and the supply
of technology in the technology market. Firm- specific measures of legal and strategic
appropriation affect the demand for technology to be acquired externally, while
industry measures of legal and strategic appropriation affect the supply of technology
to be acquired externally. One could hypothesize that if legal protection of
innovations at the industry level is tight, firms that acquire technology externally are
more likely to be able to obtain technology in disembodied form in these arms-length
transactions. However, given tight legal protection, the only way to access technology
externally, when not offered on the market, might be through indirect means such as
reverse engineering, take-overs or hiring away personnel. If innovations are easily
protected through strategic measures such as secrecy, lead time, or complexity of the
product or process, firms are more likely to find technology tied to complementary
assets and, therefore, when acquiring technology this is more likely to happen in
embodied form. Nevertheless, the fact that strategic protection is effective at the
industry level could reduce the opportunity to find technology externally and hence
affects the acquisitive behavior of the firm. On the demand side, strong legal
protection at the firm-level could encourage the firm to develop the technology
internally rather than look for it on the external technology market. Strong strategic
protection would allow the firm to appropriate the benefits of the integration of the
externally acquired technology.
Finally, we include market concentration (measured by the C4 concentration
measure) and the sectoral R&D intensity level. The concentration ratio captures the
small numbers bargaining hazards as well as the fact that tacit agreements to not
aggressively seek out new technologies which would intensify competition in the
industry, are easier to enforce between a small number of competitors. The sectoral
R&D intensity level captures technological opportunities present within the industry.
--------------------------------
Insert Table 3 about here
--------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                              
6  Alternatively, to the extent OPEN may be associated with the availability of generally
available external know-how that can be accessed as unvoluntary spillovers, it may be
capturing complementarity between a “buy” and “take” option.14
4.2 The econometric results
We analyse the firm and industry variables determining the decision to buy
technology in general and per mode, using a probit model where the dependent
variable is 1 when the firm claims to buy technology. The results of the estimation are
presented in Table 4.  The disembodied and embodied results allow us to summarize
and compare the results from the individual modes per category.  Reported as well are
the results for the individual modes, licensing, R&D contracting, take-overs and
hiring away skilled personnel 
7.  The reported coefficients are the estimated partial
derivatives of probabilities with respect to the vector of characteristics. They are
computed at the means of the independent variables. The coefficient tells us how
much the probability that the firm buys increases with an increase in that independent
variable, holding the other independent variables constant.  The high Chi-squared of
the various models indicates the high joint explanatory power of the independent
variables in all regressions.
--------------------------------
Insert Table 4 about here
--------------------------------
Larger firms are significantly more likely to acquire technology, both in
embodied and disembodied form.  Size is especially important when combining
different acquisition modes, probably explaining why the size variable looses
significance when considering most individual modes.   After controlling for firm
size, there remains a positive and strongly significant effect for openness to external
information on the decision to acquire technology, both embodied and disembodied.
This confirms the importance of a scanning capacity in external sourcing. Besides the
scanning of external information, there is a positive effect for our measures of
absorptive capacity. Permanent own internal R&D capacity and BasicRD significantly
affect the decision to acquire disembodied technology.
8  Further disaggregation of this
result over the two disembodied modes, licensing and R&D contracting, reveals that
                                                       
7 To save space, buying consulting services is not reported separately. These results are
in line with those of licensing and R&D contracting, but lack significance because of the
scarce number of observations.
8 Other measures for own R&D capacity, besides a dummy for permanent R&D
activities, such as importance of internal information to the innovation process, the R&D
intensity, ... produced less significant results.15
in-house development of technology in particular enhances the ability of the firm to
realize benefits from R&D contracting. The relative importance of information from
university and research institutes affects both licensing and R&D contracting, but is
stronger for the latter.
In line with transaction cost theory, the perceived risks of innovation seem to
discourage technology acquisition of the firm.  Contrary to expectations, this is least
likely to hold for R&D contracting.  Lack of financial resources seems to push firms
more in the direction of technology acquisition.  This is most significant for embodied
acquisition: take-overs and hiring away skilled personnel. Capital market
imperfections arising from information asymmetries might be less impeding to find
external funding for embodied acquisition than for internal development or
disembodied acquisition of technology.  A lack of qualified innovation personnel also
drives the firm to acquire technology externally. Not surprisingly, the most significant
external mode chosen in this case is R&D contracting.
An important determinant of the decision to buy technology, and whether this
acquisition is in embodied or disembodied form, is the type of protection that is
effective. If legal protection is effective for the firm (PROTlegal), firms are less likely
to acquire technology externally.  As expected, there is a significant negative effect of
legal protection on the probability of embodied acquisition.  But for licensing, a more
effective legal protection is a significant catalyst at the firm level. At the industry
level, we find that when legal protection is tight, more firms offer technology on the
technology market. This is especially true for licensing. When the firm is better in
protecting the rents from innovation through secrecy, lead time or complexity
(PROTstrat), it is significantly more likely to acquire technology externally.  Firms
acquiring technology try to appropriate any rents through embodying the technology
within complementary, but harder to replicate assets.  If these firms tend to realize
more benefits from external sourcing, it would explain the positive coefficient of
strategic protection.  The results indicate that this positive effect is only significant in
the embodied acquisition modes.  In addition, there is a negative industry effect,
which suggests that the efficiency of the firm in protecting rents should be assessed
relative to the industry level. Within industries with strong strategic protection less
technology might be offered on the external technology market.
In general, industry characteristics add little explanatory power, after
controlling for firm characteristics. Industry concentration shows up significant for16
the embodied acquisition of technology. The significant negative coefficient for
concentration in hiring away skilled personnel, confirms the problems of small
numbers bargaining and tacit agreements in markets for professionals. The R&D
intensity at the industry level stimulates external acquisition, in particular in
disembodied form.
To check the robustness of the results, we also performed a split regression by
firm size, distinguishing small (ie <50 employees) from large firms.  As already noted
supra, for the small firms the results are mainly driven by the embodied choice, since
they are less active in disembodied acquisition.  While the openness variable is
significantly positive both for small and large firms, the results for the BasicR&D and
the PermRD variables are different.  For large firms the coefficients are positive,
suggesting complementarity between make and buy, be it that they are only
significant for the disembodied buying.  For small firms the coefficients are negative,
indicating that at smaller scale of operations, the substitute relationship between make
and buy is more prominent.  The results on the protection variables are similar for the
large and the small firms, but they are are more significant for the large firms,
especially the strategic protection at the firm level.  Also the obstacle-variables are
only significant for the large firms.
5. Conclusions
While there is ample theoretical and empirical research on firm and industry
determinants of internal R&D, the literature deals less with the choice between
different innovation activities, in particular external technology acquisition. Using
data from the Community Innovation Survey on Belgian manufacturing firms, we try
to identify firm and industry characteristics that are most conductive to external
technology sourcing.  Our results indicate that the capability to scan the external
environment for new technology is important in understanding the decision of the
firm to buy technology. The capability of the firm to integrate new external
knowledge into its innovation process, however, is only important for the
disembodied technology acquisition, and more specifically for the R&D contracting.
Appropriability through legal mechanisms positively affects disembodied technology
acquisition, in particular licensing. Strategic protection, on the contrary, strongly17
determines the embodied technology acquisition mode. Other variables of interest are
risk, costs and lack of innovation personnel. Higher riskiness of the innovation
process reduces the likelihood that firms are able to agree on the transfer of
disembodied technology and the lack of innovation personnel increases the likelihood
of buying technology in the form of R&D contracting. High costs for developing
technology drive firms to buy existing embodied technology.
Given the lack of previous empirical work on this topic, the first results
generated by this paper provide some interesting suggestions for further theoretical
work which distinguishes between different acquisition modes. At the same time,
more empirical work needs to be done to check robustness of the results.  The
EUROSTAT/CIS data proves to be a rich set of information, allowing to replicate this
exercise on other European countries.  However,  the qualitative nature of most of the
information limits the analysis, in terms of quantifying internal and external sourcing
strategies.
Most companies, and especially the larger companies, seem to combine
various external acquisition strategies.  In particular, different embodied (licensing
and R&D contracting) and different disembodied modes (take-overs and hiring away
personnel) are typically combined.  An important issue for further research is hence to
study the complementarity among “technology buy” strategies. When does the use of
one external sourcing mode increase the efficiency of using other external modes
within the innovation process of the firm? Checking whether the complementarity
between the modes is driven by more than a common set of firm and industry
characteristics, requires a specific analysis, beyond the scope of the current paper.
Also the complementarity with other innovative strategies, such as R&D Cooperation
and Technology Sell, await further exploration.
References
Afuah, A., 1998, Innovation Management, Oxford University Press, 403 p.
Allen, T., 1986, Managing the flow of technology, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 317p.
Arora, A. &, Gambardella, A., 1990, Complementarity and external linkages: the
strategies of the large firms in biotechnology. Journal of Industrial Economics,
38: 361-379.18
Arora, A. & Gambardella, A., 1994, Evaluating technological information and
utilizing it: Scientific knowledge, technological capability and external
linkages in biotechnology, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organisation,
91-114.
Arrow, K. 1962, Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention. In R.
Nelson (Ed.), The rate and direction of inventive activity: 609-626. (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press).
Blonigen, B. and C. Taylor, 1997, R&D activity and acquisitions in High Technology
Industries: evidence from the US Electronics Industry, Working Paper.
Chatterji, D., 1996, Accessing external sources of technology, Research and
Technology Management, 48-56.
Cheesa, and Manzini 1998, Organizing for technological collaboration: a managerial
perspective, R&D Management, 28, 199-212.
Cohen W. and D. Levinthal, 1989, Innovation and Learning: the two faces of R&D,
The Economic Journal, 99, 569-596.
Debackere, K. & Fleurent, I. 1995, De CIS-enquete voor Vlaanderen: een non-
response analyse, Working Paper, Vlerick Management School, Gent,
Belgium.
De Bondt, R., 1996, Spillovers and innovative activities, International Journal of
Industrial Organisation, 15, 1-28.
De Bondt, R., Slaets, P. and B. Cassiman, 1992, The degree of spillovers and the
number of rivals for maximum effective r&d. International Journal of
Industrial Organization, 10, March, 35-54.
Gallini, E., 1994, Deterrence by market sharing: a strategic incentive for licensing,
American Economic Review, 74, 931-941.
Grandstand, O. and S. Sjölander, 1990, The acquisition of technology and small firms
by large firms, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organisation, 367-386.
Grossman, S. and O. Hart, 1986, The costs and benefits of ownership: a theory of
vertical and lateral integration, Journal of Political Economy, 94, 691-719.
Katz, M. & C. Shapiro, 1986, How to license intangible property, Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 101, 567-590.
Mansfield, E. , 1985, How rapidly does new industrial technology leak out?, The
Journal of Industrial Economics, 34, 217-223
Mowery, D. and N. Rosenberg, 1989, Technology and the pursuit of economic
growth, (Cambridge University Press).
Pisano, G., 1990, The R&D boundaries of the firm: an empirical analysis,
Administrative Science Quarterly, 35, 153-176.
Roberts, E. and C. Berry, 1985, Entering new businesses: selecting strategies for
success, Sloan Management Review, 26, 3, 3-17.
Spence, M., 1984, Cost reduction, competition and industry performance,
Econometrica, 52, 101-121.19
Teece, D. 1986, Profiting from technological innovation: implications for integration,
collaboration, licensing and public policy. Research Policy, 15:285-305.
Utterback, J. and W. Abernathy, 1975, A Dynamic Model of Process and Product
Innovation, Omega, 4, 3, 6, 639-656.
Veugelers, R., and B. Cassiman, 1999, Make and Buy in Innovation Strategies:
Evidence from Belgian Manufacturing Firms,  Research Policy, 28, 63-80.
Veugelers, R., 1997, Internal R&D expenditures and External Technology Sourcing,
Research Policy, 26, 3, 303-316.
Williamson, O.,  1985, The economic institutions of capitalism, firms, markets,
relational contracting (The Free Press, New York).20
Table 1: Technology Acquisition by Mode:
Total Sample
Licensing 143  (43.2%)
Disembodied 256  (77.3%) R&D Outsourcing 154  (46.5%)
Buy 331 [67%] R&D Consulting 108  (32.6%)
Embodied 218  (65.8%) (Educational) Acquisitions  77  (23.3%)
Hiring Personnel 194  (58.6%)
Purchase of Equipment 276  [56%]
Other forms of acquisition 168  [34%]
In round brackets are the numbers as % of number of buying companies; in square brackets are % of
number of innovative companies.
Table 2: Technology Acquisition by Mode:
 Subsample of small companies (<50 employees)
Licensing 23  (31%)
Disembodied R&D Outsourcing 19  (25%)
Buy 75 [50%] R&D Consulting 12  (16%)
Embodied (Educational) Acquisitions  18  (24%)
Hiring Personnel 50  (66%)
Purchase of Equipment 73  [48%]
Other forms of acquisition 45  [30%]
Inbetween round brackets are the numbers as % of number of buying companies; inbetween square
brackets are % of number of innovative companies.21
Table 3: Explanatory variables
SIZE Firm Sales in 10
8 BEF.
PROTLEG Aggregate measure of importance of patents,
registration of brands, copyright as protection
measure of innovation.
PROTSTRAT Aggregate measure of importance of secrecy,
complexity and/or lead time as a protection
measure of innovation.
PERMRD Dummy with a value of 1 if the firm is
permanently active in R&D
OPEN Measure of importance of publicly available
information to the innovative activities of the
firm
BASICRD Measure  of importance for the innovation
process of information from research
institutes and universities relative to the
importance of suppliers and customers as an
information source.
OBSTRISK Measure of importance of high risks as an
obstacle to innovation
OBSTCOST Measure of importance of no suitable
financing available as an obstacle to
innovation.
OBSTPERS Measure of importance of lack of R&D
personnel as an obstacle to innovation.
INDPROTSTRAT Importance of strategic protection at industry
level.
INDPROTLEG Importance of legal protection at industry
level.
C4 Concentration ratio of the industry.
SECTRDINT R&D to sales ratio of the industry22








































































































































































































































*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%,
standard errors between brackets.